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Commencing his book with the appearance of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet Leader and 
(as a consequence) as intelligence concern, Mark Urban comments in the preface of his 
UK Eyes Alpha that "it might be argued that now is too early to look at such recent 
events," (p. viii) and the inevitable conclusion reading his book is that this is almost 
certainly true. That Urban's volume follows so closely on the heels of current events is 
not helped by his frustrating practice (for an academic) of citing assorted published 
sources, but without either detailed citations or a bibliography. Nonetheless, the volume 
is, within these limits, very thoroughly researched. Urban's journalistic reliance on 
interviews with former officials and politicians has been considerably fortified through 
his use of political and intelligence memoirs as well as government publications. If the 
book has any fundamental drawback, it is that even with a wealth of fascinating data 
concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the British intelligence system, Urban still 
resorts to speculation and insinuation in order to reintroduce the traditional left-wing 
concerns about accountability and the ever-contentious transAtlantic "Special 
Relationship." Such a strategy of last resort is unnecessary; there is enough critical and 
sometimes even damning information in his raw data to warrant very serious interest, but 
it is of a fundamentally different order from that to which the politically committed critics 
of intelligence are accustomed.  
Urban starts out promisingly enough, asking what are essentially the classical questions 
of intelligence studies and American-influenced intelligence "theory":  
How good is British intelligence? What kind of return do ministers and officials get for 
the hundreds of millions of pounds spent on espionage each year? How does this secret 
establishment find direction and purpose in an age when old certainties have evaporated? 
(p. vii)  
As far as this goes, Urban is asking all the right questions, and gets some interesting and 
compelling answers. Just as Michael Herman has noted in his Intelligence Power in 
Peace and War, one of the potential drawbacks of a consensus-based, all-source analysis 
system is so-called "group think." This manifests itself in the Joint Intelligence 
Community (JIC) through both the emergence of certain unquestioned orthodoxies, and 
also a tendency for its evaluations to reflect the lowest common denominator of 
participants' opinions. However, where Herman provides a general warning from insider 
experience, Urban quotes ministerial and Whitehall consumers in support of this 
tendency (or at least its perceived occurrence), and also provides, and quotes former 
ministers (including the ill starred David Mellor) about their dissatisfaction with the 
blandness of JIC reports, and their dependency on a consensus on a "lowest common 
denominator." Moreover, Urban's portrayal of such influential figures as Margaret 
Thatcher and one-time JIC Chairman Sir Percy Cradock also suggests how strong and 
strongly committed personalities can impose an orthodoxy on JIC assessments through 
the face-to-face impact of small-group dynamics.  
For the most part, Urban's survey of British intelligence operations and the assessment 
process during the 1980s and early '90s is informative, and in many respects presents 
something of a counterpoint to the image of the British agencies at the end of the Cold 
War by James Adams (in his The New Spies, London: Hutchinson, 1994). Adams 
develops a picture of a Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) under Sir Colin McColl 
vigorously embracing the new and revising its practices and organization to meet the 
emerging intelligence needs of the post-Cold War era. Urban's SIS on the cusp of the new 
world (dis)order is one almost obsessed with "screwing" (p. 224) the Soviet/Russian 
agencies once and for all, determined to settle such old scores as Philby and Blake 
decades after the fact. Urban's accounts of the Security Service and GCHQ's 
(Government Communications Headquarters) similarly provide a sense of the mixed bag 
of successes and failures experienced by those agencies, although his discussion of 
GCHQ is far less detailed than that on MI5.  
Although Urban's account involves a limited retelling of stories, such as Oleg 
Gordievsky, or the defection of biological warfare scientist Vladimir Pasechnik, he adds 
such additional matters as the differences between British and American estimates of 
Soviet chemical warfare capabilities, and, in the cold light of post-Cold War hindsight, 
the apparent inaccuracy of both. Urban also provides a reasonably convincing picture of 
the kinds of quid pro quo that exist between the British and Americans in their so-called 
"Special Relationship." He recounts how British contributions to the costs of US space-
based SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) and overhead reconnaissance and surveillance 
systems have secured the British some limited ability to "task" these assets. He also 
compares these resources favorably with the developing European satellite intelligence 
capability (SPOT and HELIOS), and with the vast, futile expenditure on Britain's 
stillborn, independent ZIRCON satellite program. Urban also provides an account of 
British intelligence strengths and weaknesses during the Gulf War, including the 
debatable decisions over what was and was not made available to British and allied 
commanders in the field.  
Finally, Urban provides a survey of post-Cold War intelligence requirements, and some 
of the structural changes to the British system to cope with those changes. Here Urban 
makes some especially interesting observations, particularly about the future of SIGINT. 
He repeats and elaborates upon a number of the better known changes, such as MI5's new 
emphasis on counter-terrorism, and SIS' new geographical priorities and its Controller, 
Global and Functional (dealing with "motherhood" issues such as counter-proliferation 
and transnational crime). Perhaps one of Urban's interesting contributions here is his 
discussion of the contemporary information technology and its implications for both 
intelligence and security operations. For example, fibre-optics make line taps harder, and 
also make the very secure communications through so-called "quantum key" ciphers a 
possibility. And then there is the question of readily available, inexpensive and relatively 
strong encryption through the common desktop computer. UK Eyes Alpha raises very real 
questions about the degree to which commercial strong encryption will make COMINT 
(Communications Intelligence) that much more difficult, particularly where counter-
terrorism and serious crime are concerned. In view of the recent successful attack on the 
export version of the RSA encryption key, it may be possible that Urban is 
overestimating the problems presented by cheap and cheery strong encryption. 
Nonetheless, Urban is asking the kinds of questions about intelligence and information 
technology which need to be asked, and still remain imperfectly examined in the 
literature.  
Despite Urban's wealth of raw material, he nonetheless seems to feel the need to resort to 
sloppy reasoning and speculation in order to preserve the classical political concerns 
about control and accountability. For example, one of the items featured in the 1989 
Security Service Act absent from the earlier 1952 Maxwell-Fyffe Directive is the 
provision for the Security Service to act in defence of Britain's "economic well-being." 
Of this new clause, Urban asserts that "people within the Service did not have a precise 
idea of what the 'economic well-being' clause amounted to . . . one MI5 officer suggests 
that the clause was put in 'just in case'." Urban's conclusion is that the clause's appearance 
is "an example of the Service's tendency to seek maximum freedom in defining its role 
and preserving its establishment." (p. 53) It would, however, seem rather unlikely for the 
Security Service's officials to have agitated legislators for the inclusion in the 1989 Act of 
an item those officials did not themselves understand. Rather, the clause's appearance 
would seem more likely to represent a perceived potential need on the part of the 
Service's consumers in Downing Street and Whitehall, particularly in view of much the 
same clause appearing four years before in the 1985 Interception of Communications Act 
and five years later in the 1994 Intelligence Services Act. Much the same might be said 
about the numerous occasions in which, deprived of any real facts to work from, Urban 
resorts to speculation and insinuation. Did MI5 and the National Security Agency (NSA) 
bug the communications rooms of foreign embassies in Britain during the 1980s, as had 
the NSA and Australia's ASIO? Urban does not know, but remarks that "it would be 
surprising if the US eavesdropping agency did not exploit its relationship with the UK to 
mount such operations in London." (p. 244) The Seabed Operations Vessel HMS 
Challenger had among its tasks the protection of British undersea communication lines 
from Soviet taps (similar to the American IVY BELLS operation against the USSR). But 
did it mount such taps itself? Urban does not know, "but a question remains . . .." (p. 247) 
And, of course, such occasions are the sort of opportunity to adopt the pejorative 
language of "Britain's spies" rather than intelligence officers, services or community, or 
"eavesdropping" rather than SIGINT. For the most part, however, Urban's outbursts of 
guesswork and suggestion are more tactfully embedded in the larger narrative, but that 
makes them more difficult to locate and isolate from Urban's more valuable, factual 
information.  
For the most part, then, Urban's UK Eyes Alpha is a valuable contribution to the field, 
although occasionally one has to read somewhat carefully. The book does a thorough job 
of examining the British intelligence system over the second half of the 1980s and the 
early 1990s, despite the limitations of the volume and kind of data available. The only 
real drawback is Urban's apparent need to gild the critical lily, entirely unnecessary given 
the very real range of British intelligence strengths and weaknesses that emerge from his 
factual narrative.  
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